Introduction
Much of the theoretical controversy within the domain of structural linguistics throughout the twentieth century has centered on the debate between empiricism and rationalism. The extreme empiricistic framework of the American Structural-ists, represented most clearly in the writings of Leonard Bloomfield, was severely attacked by Noam Chomsky, only to be replaced by his equally extreme version of rationalism. The obvious need for some sort of theoretical synthesis has never been met. More than half a century ago, Ernst Cassirer, a philosopher, not a linguist, explicitly suggested such a synthesis, a comprehensive theory of language which, unfortunately, went virtually unnoticed in the linguistic world. For Cassirer, language was a symbolic form, a set of categories for the interpretation of reality, a reflection of a mode of thought, a means of dealing with experience. Crucially, Cassirer's theory assigns the notion of linguistic meaning a constitutive status within the overall structure of language. Both synchronically and diachronically, linguistic meaning is the basis of linguistic knowledge. Unfortunately, the denial of the constitutive status of meaning is probably the one major theoretical presupposition shared by American structuralism and Chomsky's generative grammar (in its original format and in most of its theoretical offsprings). Both schools of thought work by the assumption that linguistic structure is in its very essence autonomous from meaning, and both have assigned linguistic meaning a secondary status within their respective frameworks. American structuralism is no longer with us, and the denial of the relevance of meaning to the grammar of natural language seems to be leading the more radical versions of generative grammar to an obscure dead-end. Cassirer's philosophical view of language, at any rate, has been of little use to linguists of both persuasions.
In the last decade, however, the generative study of linguistic meaning has managed to develop into a substantive framework -that of lexical semantics. The careful study of the meanings of words -and the intricate relations between the meanings of the words and their syntactic and morphological behavioral patterns -reveals the dramatic extent to which linguistic meaning and linguistic structure are transparent to each other. The presupposition of the autonomy of syntactic structure from linguistic meaning is gradually being discredited, and linguistic meaning is taking the constitutive role in a new theoretical framework. The overall view of the nature of linguistic knowledge which is emerging out of this enterprise seems to me to bear close resemblance to Cassirer's theoretical synthesis. As is often the case with such fortunate convergences, the affinity seems to work well for both sides: The empirical findings lend support to Cassirer's most fundamental claims; Cassirer's philosophical perspective helps position the empirical framework in its appropriate epistemological context. This affinity is worth pursuing, and in this paper I propose to make the first step -highlight what I believe are the major points of agreement and mutual enrichment, and discuss their significance for both linguistics and the philosophy of language. In section 2,1 will try to give the reader some sense of what the emerging framework of lexical semantics is about. In section 3, I will discuss the theoretical correspondence between the results accumulated within this framework and three of Cassirer's most fundamental insights, those which constitute the basis for his conception of language as a symbolic form: (i) natural language grammars constitute structural reflections of a deeplyrooted, highly structured level of semantic organization; which means that an explanation of linguistic forms, as opposed to a mere description of them, is possible only via a theory of linguistic meaning; this is what Urban (1949) , discussing Cassirer's theory of language, calls the methodological principle of the primacy of meaning; (ii) the representational level of linguistic meaning, which is prior to experience in the Kantian sense, comprises & partial set of semantic notions, which language selects as centers of perceptual attention; (iii) this partial set is potentially different from the sets selected by other symbolic forms, such as myth, science and art.
In section 4,1 will venture to make a few linguistically-motivated remarks about the proper philosophical interpretation of Cassirer's framework. I will suggest that the major internal tension in his writings -that ever-present struggle between the neo-Kantian universalist and the relativistic, anthropologically-oriented thinker -should not necessarily be thought of as the unfortunate, albeit fascinating result of an unresolved conflict between two contradictory world-views. I will suggest that it may be interpreted as the result of a persistent attempt to formulate the synthetic, empirically-oriented question of the universal properties of cultural relativism: Is it possible to maintain the major Kantian insights and still acknowledge the richness and diversity of cultural forms? Is it possible to account for this cultural diversity in universalistic terms? I believe that Cassirer's principled answer to this question, on the philosophical level, was a positive one. In this sense, the results accumulated in the domain of lexical semantics are of exactly the right type to provide the necessary empirical support for Cassirer philosophical synthesis.
Linguistic Semantics
The first thing I would like to do is give the reader a sense of what the new linguistic framework is about. Let us concentrate, by way of demonstration, on one empirical problem -having to do with some verbs in English, their meanings and their patterns of syntactic behavior. You may be aware of the (seemingly) simple fact that different verbs are capable of appearing in different syntactic contexts: some verbs (e.g., build, bake) are transitive (they require two arguments, a subject and a direct object); some verbs (e.g., run, sleep) are intransitive (they only require one argument, a subject); other verbs (e.g., give), require three arguments, a subject and two objects (we cannot say *'John gave,' or *'John gave the book'; we can only say 'John gave the book to Mary. 5 ) 1 A natural question arises: What determines these different patterns of syntactic behavior? The non-linguist may feel that the The asterisk marks an ungrammatical sentence. answer is trivial, almost self-evident: Different verbs require different sets of syntactic arguments because they mean different things. Running and sleeping are about runners and sleepers, but building and baking are not just about builders and bakers; they are also about buildings and cakes; and giving is not just about the giver {John in the above example) and the thing given {the book), but also about the receiver {Mary). Putting it in slightly more technical terms, we may say that the non-linguist's intuition is basically this: (i) different verbs describe different types of events, with different sets of participants; (ii) the syntactic arguments required by the verbs denote these participants; (iii) thus, the number of syntactic arguments, and their types, are determined by the meanings of the verbs.
For a very long while, common-sense answers of this type were firmly denied within linguistics; meaning was not considered a legitimate participant in the linguistic game, and syntactic facts were supposed to be given an explanation in terms of an autonomous syntactic theory. When people finally started looking more closely into the relations between meaning and form, it soon became clear that explicating the above pre-theoretical intuition is a much more complicated task than might be expected. To reach our explanatory goal, we need at least two pieces of theory: We need a real theory of lexical meaning, one which allows for non-trivial, non-idiosyncratic description of the meanings of the verbs; and we need an explicit linking theory -one which explains how our meaning descriptions determine the syntactic facts. These two pieces of theory, taken together, have to capture and explain sets of syntactic observations, which prove to be extremely complex and subtle. Thus, for example, it turns out that verbs differ extensively with respect to their syntactic elasticity: Some verbs appear in a bewildering range of syntactic contexts, whereas others seem to be extremely constrained in their syntactic behavior (Rappaport-Hovav and Levin 1997 Note that this variation in syntactic behavior involves not only the number and syntactic type of the arguments of the verbs, but also the allowable combinations of these arguments. Thus, for example, sweep can take a single argument expressing the swept surface ('Terry swept the floor'), but it can only take the argument expressing the swept object if followed by a prepositional phrase. Thus, 'Terry swept the leaves off the sidewalk' is grammatical, but *'Terry swept the leaves' is completely out. How can we explain this diversity in syntactic behavior? Well, one thing is certain: At first sight, the examples in (l)-(4) seem to render the pretheoretical hypothesis we started with, the one that seemed almost self-evident, totally inadequate. In what sense is running about raggedness? What is it about the meaning of sweep which is related to making a pile out of leaves? If we can 'sweep crumbs into corners', why can't we 'break dishes off tables? If we can 'run shoes to shreds,'why can't we 'go shoes to shreds'? Proponents of the autonomy hypothesis have always used examples of this type to demonstrate the intrinsic futility of the semantic enterprise. There is just no conceivable way, so they claimed, to derive the syntactic subtleties from the meanings of the verbs. A much simpler hypothesis would be that the verbs have independent syntactic properties, such that some of them can appear in more syntactic contexts than others. After all, we know that verbs have independent phonological and morphological properties, and we do not feel that we must find a way to derive those from the meanings. There is just no point in struggling with the semantic complexities to explain syntactic patterns that seem totally unrelated.
But lexical semanticists have been struggling with complexities of this type for the last decade or two, and Rappaport-Hovav and Levin use some of the insights already accumulated in the field to develop a remarkable explanation of the above behavioral patterns. The first thing to note is the well-known observation that verbs belong to verb classes. The members of a verb class characteristically manifest similar properties, both in terms of their semantics and their syntactic behavior. Sweep, for example, belongs to the class of so-called surface contact verbs, which also includes, among other verbs, wipe and scrub. These two verbs, which are obviously close in meaning to sweep, appear in the same set of syntactic configurations that sweep appears in (the reader is welcome to check that by replacing sweep with wipe in the examples in (1)). Break, to take another example, is a change of state verb, just like chip, crack and fracture. Run is a manner of motion verb, as opposed to go, which is a verb of directed motion (it does not specify the manner of motion, but rather the fact that it is goal oriented). As the names of the verb classes indicate, all the verbs in a specific verb class denote the same type of event. They differ between themselves only with respect to the idiosyncratic properties of the events they denote: Run and walk, for example, denote events of moving in a certain manner, and only differ with respect to the idiosyncratic properties of the manner of movement itself.
A major insight, stemming out of research in formal semantics, lexical semantics and the philosophy of language, is that all the different types of events, denoted by the different verb classes, are manifestations of a very constrained set of basic event types. Formal details aside, researchers agree that the inventory of basic event types includes no more than four event types: Activities, accomplishments, states, and achievements. Let us look at them one by one. Manner of motion verbs (run, walk) and surface contact verbs (sweep, wipe) denote activities of different types: Activities happen in different ways (manners), and they do not necessarily cause any change of state. When we move a sweeper back and forth over the surface of a perfectly clean floor, we do not change the state of the floor (we do not clean it by sweeping), but we nevertheless sweep the floor. When we run in place (on a treadmill, for example), we do not change our position, we do not 'go anywhere,' but we run all the same. Verbs of directed motion (go, come) and verbs of change of state (break, crack) denote accomplishments -activities (with specified manners or without them) resulting in some change of state. If, for example, Kelly is reported to have broken the dishes, then she is reported to have done something to cause the dishes to break, and the dishes are reported to have broken as a result of that act. Verbs like find out and discover, which we haven't looked at yet, denote achievements, which involve an instantaneous change of state, and do not specify the cause of this change of state. Verbs like sleep and know denote states -situations which exist over time in a static fashion. Rappaport-Hovav and Levin represent this inventory of basic event types in the following fashion (the event type of accomplishment is represented in two versions, with and without a specification of the manner of the causing activity):
Thus, it turns out that those verbs which manifest syntactic elasticity -surface contact verbs, verbs of manner of motion -are activity verbs; the verbs which manifest the more rigid syntactic behavior -verbs of directed motion, verbs of change of state -are accomplishment verbs. So far, so good. Now, another crucial observation. The set of usages of sweep and run, in (1) and (3), can be divided into two subsets: The set of basic usages (la,b and 3a) involve the verbs in their basic role, as activity verbs: 'Terry swept the floor'; 'Terry swept'; 'Pet ran'. The set of extended usages (in (lc,d,e,f) and in (3b,c,d,e,f)), on the other hand, always involves the expansion of the basic event type of the verbs (an activity) to yield various kinds of accomplishments: If Terry swept the crumbs into the corner, then the crumbs changed their state as a result of Terry's sweeping; if Pat ran her shoes to shreds, then Pat's shoes were destroyed as a result of her running. Rappaport-Hovav and Levin claim that this semantic observation is the key to the distinction in syntactic behavior. Informally, they suggest that (a) verbs can be used to mean more than they basically do (i.e., verbs can be used with extended meanings), only if their basic event type can be augmented to a more complex one, but that on the other hand, (b) verbs cannot be used to mean less than they basically do.
As the representations of the basic event types in (5) indicate, activities are obligatory components of accomplishments; activities can thus be augmented to accomplishments, and activity verbs can be used as accomplishment verbs (with an additional object indicating the resulting change of state). Accomplishments, on the other hand, cannot be augmented to a more complex event type, because they are the maximally complex event type in the inventory. This is why accomplishment verbs cannot be used to describe an event of change of state resulting in another change of state (e.g., *'Kelly broke the dishes off the table'). Moreover, accomplishments cannot be used as activity verbs (e.g., *'Kelly broke'), because verbs cannot be used to mean less then they basically do, and the meaning component of the resulting change of state is an obligatory component of the basic meaning of accomplishments.
The bottom line is this: Syntactic elasticity reflects semantic elasticity, as defined within the theory of event types. The syntactically elastic verbs are those which denote events of the extendible type, and the additional syntactic arguments which appear with them are predictable from the nature of the event to which they are extended; the syntactically rigid verbs are those which denote maximally complex events, and are thus unable to extend their meanings. The non-linguist's initial intuition was right after all: The complex and subtle patterns of the verbs'syntactic behaviors are reducible, albeit in a sophisticated sense, to what the verbs mean.
Rappaport-Hovav and Levin's analysis provides a remarkable demonstration of the dramatic extent to which grammatical phenomena constitute structural reflections of semantic generalizations. Strictly speaking, the analysis does not refute the autonomy hypothesis. This is an important point to remember: As is so often the case with such overarching, constitutive scientific principles, the auto-nomy hypothesis is perfectly irrefutable. It claims that a significantly large set of core structural phenomena in language is immune to explanation in terms of a meaning-based theory. Any attempt to refute a hypothesis of this type should thus provide for total coverage of the entire set of structural-syntactic phenomena of a language. As no linguistic theory, regardless of ideological inclination, is anywhere close to a fully explicit description of a single language, the autonomy hypothesis is in no danger of being refuted. Demonstrations of the type we have just looked at, to the extent that they pass the test of empirical scrutiny, do no damage to the autonomy hypothesis itself -they only bite at the borders of its empirical envelope. This, however, is significant enough. Analyses of the type developed by Rappaport-Hovav and Levin serve to weaken the value of the autonomy hypothesis as a default hypothesis. They strengthen the suspicion that the autonomy hypothesis reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of linguistic meaning, rather than some deep insight into the nature of language. Together with a long list of other works, Rappaport-Hovav and Levin's work helps identify and explicate the set of constitutive semantic notions which play a role in determining grammatical structures. We have seen, for example, that the theory of event-types -with its four-way distinction between activities, accomplishments, states and achievements -is a major constitutive semantic component, determining aspects of grammar. As we shall see later, not all conceivable semantic notions participate in the determination of grammar, and the distinction between those semantic notions which are linguistically constitutive and those which are linguistically irrelevant provides some of the basis for the comparison with Cassirer's philosophical synthesis.
Symbolic Forms
Let us, then, take a break from the empirical discussion and take a look at Cassirer's theory of language. Rather then review Cassirer's philosophy, I would like to concentrate on three of the most fundamental insights underlying his general outlook. For me, these insights, these theoretical anchors, are those which make Cassirer attractive as a source of inspiration and as a philosophical ally. As far as I can tell, my reading of these points is far from being controversial or even novel in any significant way. My point here is not so much philosophical as it is practical: The three fundamental insights define what I consider to be the backbone of a specific and principled research program for linguistics -a program validated by the results of lexical semantic analyses.
The first theoretical anchor is Cassirer's insistence on a specific type of explanation for linguistic phenomena. Throughout his work, Cassirer stresses the necessity of an approach to formal systems -language, art, myth, science -which is at the same time functionally-oriented and structurally-bound: In the case of language, the entities to be explained are grammatical structures, and their explanation should be based on functional notions of meaning. To the non-linguist, this point may seem rather trivial, but should not be taken lightly, as it stands in sharp contrast to the most influential conceptions of the twentieth century in the domains of linguistics and the philosophy of language -not just American Structuralism and Generative Grammar (in its original format and most of its offsprings), but also those schools of thought which do consider meaning to be a constitutive and necessary component of linguistic explanation. In a nutshell: The Structuralists and the Generativists have always been acutely aware of the intricacies of linguistic structures, and of the need to capture these intricacies in all their minute details, and have always insisted on the necessity of explaining these intricacies on the structural level. They have always objected to functionally-oriented modes of explanation for a whole host of reasons, including their conviction that a scientifically-sound theory of meaning is unattainable in principle. Pragmatically and functionally-oriented schools of linguistics (such as the different linguistic offspring of Wittgensteinian thought) have usually been interested in developing functional theories of communication as means for explaining linguistic behavior. Thus, they characteristically (and justifiably) adopt a method of abstracting away from structural complexities. Where they do attempt to explain structural phenomena, their analyses almost always fall short of capturing the most basic facts -it just so happens that linguistic structures reflect a highly specific level of semantic organization, not a general-purpose theory of communication. Logically-oriented schools of thought (such as the different branches of formal semantics) are by their very definition about meaning, but they are characteristically interested in explaining linguistic meaning in terms of logic, not in explaining linguistic structure in terms of linguistic meaning. Many of the results accumulated within the domain of formal semantics have proven to be of utmost importance for linguistic semantics, as they help explicate the constitutive semantic notions relevant for language. The theory of event types, for example, has been thoroughly explicated in terms of an aspectual logic. But formal semantics has usually refrained from reducing structural complexities to logical structures.
In sharp contrast to these approaches, Cassirer was adamant that a close examination of the structural details leads the way to the constitutive universals of meaning. He was intimately acquainted with the linguistic analyses of his time, and perfectly aware of the unbelievable intricacies of grammatical structures. But he was at the same time convinced that this complexity of grammar is not a structural phenomenon as such, but a reflection of a deeply-rooted level of semantic organization. In more recent terms, he worked with the assumption that "a difference in syntactic form always spells a difference in meaning" (Bolinger 1968) , and took it to be the guiding principle for linguistic research. For Cassirer, says Urban, the sole entrance to the understanding of language is through meaning, for meaning is the sine qua non of the linguistic fact. The significance of this principle of the primacy of meaning is far reaching. It means negatively .... the denial of the adequacy of external approaches to language; whether physical, physiological, or even psychological; but it involves also, positively, significant changes in methodology. Earlier methods proceeded from the elements to the whole -from the sounds to the words, from words to sentences, and finally to the meaning of discourse as a whole. The present tendency is the exact opposite. It proceeds from the whole of meaning, as Gestalt, to the sentences and words as elements -the parts being understood through the whole. (Urban 1949, 411) It should be clear that no real theoretical negotiation is possible between a theory of this type, and a theory of the type which denies the relevance of meaning as an explanatory tool for linguistic forms. Putting it bluntly, if Bloomfield and Chomsky turned out to be right, and linguistic forms were really autonomous from notions of meaning, then Cassirer's theory would be doomed to collapse at the level of presupposition. This is why the results of lexical semantics are so important for Cassirer's framework: The burden of proof is on those who wish to establish the explanatory link between meaning and form, not on those who deny it. Thus, providing a critical mass of empirical demonstrations for the principle of the primacy of meaning -demonstrations of the type we have just looked at -is nothing less than a necessary prerequisite for any rational discussion of the linguistically-oriented components of Cassirer's theory.
Let us, then, take the next step and look at the second theoretical anchor, Cassirer's specific characterization of the semantic function. This characterization is probably the most fundamental tenet of his world-view, the foundation of his notion of the symbolic form. "In Kant," Cassirer tells us, "the object, as 'object in experience,' is not something outside of and apart from cognition; on the contrary, it is only 'made possible,' determined and constituted by the categories of cognition. Similarly, the subjectivity of language ... appears ... as a means of forming, of 'objectifying' sensory impressions. Like cognition, language does not merely 'copy' a given object; it rather embodies a spiritual attitude which is always a crucial factor in our perception of the objective" (Cassirer 1953, 158) . What is this spiritual attitude embodied by language? Well, it is man's capacity for what Cassirer calls reflective thought -"the ability of man to single out from the whole undiscriminated mass of the stream of floating sensuous phenomena certain fixed elements in order to isolate them and to concentrate attention upon them" (Cassirer 1944, 39) . The semantic function of language is thus not to reproduce reality, but rather to allow for an interpretation of reality, and it is capable of doing this exactly because it is not designed to refer exhaustively to events, actions, entities and properties in the world, but rather to certain aspects of these events, actions, entities and properties; and these particular aspects of meaning, the categories singled out and isolated by language, do not reflect an inherent truth about the world, but a deeply-rooted level of semantic organization in the mind:
The function of a name is always limited to emphasizing a particular aspect of a thing, and it is precisely this restriction and limitation upon which the value of the name depends. It is not the function of a name to refer exhaustively to a concrete situation, but merely to single out and dwell upon a certain aspect. The isolation of this aspect is not a negative but a positive act. For in the act of denomination we select, out of the multiplicity and diffusion of our sense data, certain fixed centers of perception. The centers are not the same as in logical or scientific thought. The terms of ordinary speech are not to be measured by the same standards as those in which we express scientific concepts ... our everyday terms and names are the milestones on the road which leads to scientific concepts; it is in these terms that we receive our first objective or theoretical view of the world. (Ibid., This is exactly the right way to interpret the empirical results of the type demonstrated by Rappaport-Hovav and Levin's analysis: The verbs we have looked at do not refer exhaustively to the events they denote; they only refer to particular aspects of the events, aspects which are thus singled out and emphasized. These aspects are such notions as motion, manner of motion, causation, change of state and so on -the building blocks of the set of event types we have looked at before. There is a world of theoretical difference between the meanings of the verbs, which are linguistic entities, and the meanings of the concepts, which are their nonlinguistic counterparts. The concept of sweeping, for example, may be semantically connected to a very rich and complex set of facts, beliefs, and feelings (for example, sweeping is usually done with the purpose of cleaning the surface; it is usually done with a certain instrument, a broom; it is not generally thought of as a very pleasant activity; and so on). The verb sweep, on the other hand, as far as its linguistic meaning is concerned, only refers to motion in contact with a surfacean event of a specific type, a member of the set of possible event types in natural languages. These meaning components, motion and contact, are the only components which language, so to speak, decided to isolate and single out: The verb sweep may be used to describe events where no surface is being cleaned, or where no sweeper is being used, but it cannot describe events where there is no motion in contact with a surface.
Moreover, the set of basic event types, which turns out to form the constitutive basis of the structural phenomena we have looked at, does not exhaust the inventory of possible events in the real world. It comprises a small and highlyconstrained set of event types, isolated and highlighted by language itself. There is nothing inherently false, or ontologically impossible, about those combinations of event types which language does not permit. We may cause dishes to fall off a table by breaking them (imagine the dishes glued to the surface of the table, close to the edge, such that breaking them will cause their fragments to fall off the table); more obviously, a coach may make his athletes go around the track. What is impossible is describing these events as 'breaking the dishes off the table' and 'going the athletes around the track,' and this is a fact about the categories of language, not about the way the world is. A dramatic demonstration of this view is provided by the fact that some of the sentences in (l)-(4) which are grammatical in English are nevertheless ungrammatical in other languages: The modern Hebrew equivalent o f Pat ran her shoes to shreds,'for example, is completely out. Explaining this fact is far from being a trivial task, and it certainly does not mean what the linguistic relativists would like it to mean -modern Hebrew speakers definitely do not have a totally different conceptual view of the world. What it does indicate is that the languages, English and modern Hebrew, treat the set of basic event types (which seems to be universally valid), and the relationship between this set and the different verb classes, in slightly different ways, neither of which is determined by, or copied from the "things as they are" in the real world. This, to me, is a perfectly Cassirerian state of affairs.
The last theoretical anchor is Cassirer's characterization of the different symbolic forms -language, myth, art, religion, science -as distinct forms, embodying distinct sets of semantic categories and thus reflecting distinct world-views. What this conception of the plurality of symbolic forms implies is that only a specific subset of semantic notions should prove to be linguistically constitutive, while other semantic notions, which may or may not play a constitutive role in other symbolic forms, should prove to be linguistically irrelevant. This is exactly what we find in our empirical studies: In Rappaport-Hovav and Levin's analysis, for example, we have seen that the meaning distinctions between verbs which belong to the same verb class are irrelevant for linguistic structure. As far as language is concerned, sweep and wipe are indistinguishable; it is only their event type, that of movement involving contact with a surface, which is singled out and isolated by language, and is thus a constitutive determinant of its structure. (Note, again, that conceptually speaking, sweeping and wiping are different.) Other demonstrations of this property of language abound, some of which have actually been of interest to Cassirer himself. Frawley (1992) , for example, compares two robust and important semantic distinctions: The distinction between animate and inanimate objects (which Cassirer discusses at length), and the distinction between natural and nominal kinds -which has to do with the difference between common nouns that denote inherently and common nouns that denote compositionally. The distinction between natural and nominal kinds is visible throughout the lexicon: tiger, gold, hepatitis, heat, pain, and red are natural kinds; car, wheel, coat, wedding, divorce, and president are nominal kinds. As common nouns denoting natural kinds usually refer to entities in the natural world, and common nouns denoting nominal kinds regularly refer to cultural, technological or logical artifacts, the distinction between them probably plays a rather important symbolic role in man's conception of the world. However, as Frawley shows, this semantic distinction has no bearing on the grammatical structures of natural languages. Natural kind terms have no unique structural properties: "both natural and nominal kinds take articles (the gold, the wedding) and quantifiers (some gold, many weddings). English does not differentiate the two in terms of pluralization (two tigers, two divorces) or verb choice (the tiger fell down, the coat fell down; pain annoys me, the president annoys me) ... In fact, no language appears to differentiate natural from nominal kinds by any sort of formal device." The distinction between animate and inanimate objects, on the other hand, has "some grammatical reflex" in every language. In some languages, for example, the degree of animacy determines subject-verb agreement and pronoun choice. The notion of animacy, as opposed to that of natural/ nominal kinds, is thus universally a constitutive linguistic category, a member of the set of notions which language "isolates as fixed centers of attention".
The emerging empirical picture is this: Grammars of natural languages do not comprise sets of autonomously structural facts to be discovered and learned from experience, through the exposure to streams of speech (this is the classical empiricistic view of the acquisition of language). Nor do grammars of natural languages comprise sets of autonomously structural facts innately given as part of our genetic endowment for language (this is Chomsky's rationalistic view of the acquisition of language). Natural language grammars constitute structural reflections of a deeply-rooted, highly structured level of semantic organization. This level of semantic organization is prior to experience; it is a means for dealing with experience. The constitutive components of this level comprise a linguisticallyconstrained subset of semantic categories, and these categories serve to isolate and foreground certain aspects of reality -not necessarily those aspects of reality isolated and foregrounded by the other symbolic forms developed by man. The distinction between those semantic categories which are linguistically constitutive and those which are linguistically irrelevant is not a matter of the way the world is -it is a matter of the way the mind is, more specifically, it is a matter of the way the mind is in its linguistic capacity. The importance of the empirical results accumulated by lexical semanticists thus goes a long way beyond the specific syntactic phenomena they manage to capture and explain: They suggest a new means of assigning a functional explanation to the structural phenomena of language, and the type of functional explanation they suggest is in its essence a Cassirerian one.
The Synthetic Question: Universalism and Relativism
The movement from a structurally-autonomous theory of language to a meaningbased theory re-defines the age-old question of universalism and relativism. Consider Cassirer's philosophy of language as a whole: Is he a universalist or a relativist? On the one hand, he certainly seems to be thinking about language, in the most general terms, as a universal symbolic form, shared by all human beings, a specifically human trait with specific functional properties; does this make him a universalist? On the other hand, he definitely acknowledges the differences between specific languages, and the fact that different languages may "single out and isolate" different sets of semantic notions, and thus reflect different "world views"; does that make him a relativist? Elkana (1998) claimed that Cassirer started out with a universalistic, essentialistic plan, but "failed to provide the goods," and was thus, so to speak, fortunately pushed into the hands of relativism. Implicit in this description is Elkana's own conviction that there are no goods to be provided, no real universals to be found lurking beneath the descriptive level of cultural diversity. I believe that there are such universals to be found, that Cassirer himself believed in such universals, and that the questions he asked about these universals were exactly on the right track. Of course, formulating the right questions does not amount to providing empirically-supported answers, and I do agree that Cassirer does not really provide a rigorous set of answers to his questions. This, however, does not mean that he should be read as abandoning his synthetic quest in favor of a purely relativistic world view.
There is no doubt that, unlike other universalists, Cassirer does not give in to the temptation to shove the diversity of linguistic forms under the rug. This, for me, is in and of itself one of his greatest conceptual achievements as a philosopher of language. Over and over again, he reminds his readers that a simple-minded essentialistic view does not pass the test of empirical scrutiny:
Many grammatical distinctions which we think fundamental and necessary lose their value or at least become very uncertain as soon as we examine languages other than those of the Indo-European family. That there must exist a definite and unique system of the parts of speech, which is to be regarded as a necessary constituent of rational speech and thought, has turned out to be an illusion. (Cassirer 1944, 127) Moreover, a simple-minded essentialistic view of language misses out on one of the most important properties of language as a symbolic form: Different languages potentially construct different world-views for their speakers. When learning a foreign language, says Cassirer, it is not sufficient to acquire a new vocabulary or to acquaint ourselves with a system of abstract grammatical rules. All this is necessary but it is only the first and less important step. If we do not learn to think in the new language all our efforts remain fruitless ... When penetrating into the "spirit" of a foreign tongue we invariably have the impression of approaching a new world, a world which has an intellectual structure of its own. It is like a voyage of discovery in an alien land, and the greatest gain from such a voyage lies in our having learned to look upon our mother tongue in a new light... A comparison of different languages shows us that there are no exact synonyms. Corresponding terms from two languages seldom refer to the same objects or actions. They cover different fields which interpenetrate and give many-colored views and varied perspectives of our experience. (Ibid., 133) Are these the views of a radical relativist? I do not think so. Cassirer explicitly says that the diversity of languages makes the universalistic question more complex, but does not in any way render it obsolete:
All this does not necessarily prove that we must give up the old concept of a grammaire generate et raisonnee, a general grammar based on rational principles. But we must redefine this concept and we must formulate it in a new sense. (Ibid., 127) The new universalistic question, the one which takes the diversity of languages into account, is the one which strives to distinguish the universal properties of language as a symbolic form from those properties of specific languages which are of a more accidental nature:
According to Sapir every language contains certain necessary and indispensable categories side by side with others that are of a more accidental character. The idea of a general or philosophical grammar is, therefore, by no means invalidated by the progress of linguistic research, although we can no longer hope to realize such a grammar by the simple means that were employed in former attempts. (Ibid., 128) Discussing the question of the "individual form" of a language, a notion which he takes from Sapir, Cassirer says:
When confronted with this question we are always on the horns of a dilemma. We have two extremes to avoid, two radical solutions, which are both in a sense inadequate. If the thesis that every language has its individual form were to imply that it is needless to look for any common features in human speech, we should have to admit that the mere thought of a philosophy of language is a castle in the air. But what is open to objection from an empirical point of view is not so much the existence as the clear statement of these common features (Ibid., 126) This, I believe, is an extremely clear formulation of his approach: The simpleminded universalistic view is unattainable, but so is the radical relativistic one. There is no real reason to doubt the existence of "common features" in all languages; the question of the actual nature of these features, their specific properties, is an empirical question, to be resolved on empirical grounds. Significantly, some of the linguistic notions which Cassirer takes interest in, as candidates for such universals of meaning -the notions of space and time, the notion of plurality, and so on -are exactly those which lexical semanticists think of as putative universals.
That Cassirer sticks to his universalistic quest is also evidenced by his deep interest in the psychological and cognitive aspects of language. An honest radical relativist has no reason to dwell on such issues as language acquisition and language deficits. Consider, for example, his characterization of the period in the process of language acquisition, when, universally, children acquire new lexical items at the rate of about ten new words per day.
The child himself has a clear sense of the significance of the new instrument for his mental development. He is not satisfied with being taught in a purely receptive manner but takes an active share in the process of speech which is at the same time a process of progressive objedification... "By the beginning of the twenty-third month," says D. R. Major, "the child had developed a mania for going about naming things as if to tell others their names, or to call our attention to the things has was examining. He would look at, point toward, or put his hand on an article, speak its name, then look at his companions." Such an attitude would not be understandable were it not for the fact that the name, in the mental growth of the child, has a function of the first importance to perform. If a child when learning to talk had simply to learn a certain vocabulary, if he only had to impress on his mind and memory a great mass of artificial and arbitrary sounds, this would be a purely mechanical process. It would be very laborious and tiresome, and would require too great conscious effort for the child to make without a certain reluctance since what he is expected to do would be entirely disconnected from actual biological needs... By learning to name things a child ... learns rather to form the concepts of those objects, to come to terms with the objective world. Henceforth the child stands on firmer ground. His vague, uncertain, fluctuating perceptions and his dim feelings begin to assume a new shape. They may be said to crystallize around the name as a fixed center, a focus of thought. The first names of which a child makes conscious use may be compared to a stick by the aid of which a blind man gropes his way. (Ibid., 131-2) This is not just a universalistic passage. It may almost be read as an argument for the innateness of the universal features of word meaning -a view adhered to by many lexical semanticists: All children, all speakers-to-be of all languages, go through the period of naming explosion at the same age, with the same enthusiasm, and they all seem to know, in advance, what they need to look for. They seem to know enough about nouns and verbs, about events and properties, about concrete and abstract notions, to make their way around the complexities of word meanings in a natural and easy-going fashion. Cassirer's insistence that children grasp the symbolic function of language, at the stage of development when their general understanding of the world is nothing but aset of "vague, uncertain and fluctuating perceptions," should lead us to the very same conclusion -that language acquisition is innately-driven. Otherwise, how do children manage to grasp the complex and highly abstract symbolic function of their first words so quickly and so easily? If their world is that of the blind man, and their first words are the stick by which he gropes his way, how do they get to put their hands on the stick in the first place? Cassirer's answer, to my mind, is a rather clear statement oifunctional universality: the true unity of language, if there is such a unity, cannot be a substantial one; it must rather be defined as a functional unity. Such a unity does not presuppose a material or formal identity. Two different languages may represent opposite extremes both with respect to their phonetic systems or to their parts-of-speech systems. This does not prevent them from accomplishing the same task in the life of the speaking community. The important thing here is not the variety of means but their fitness for and congruity with the end. (Ibid., 130) With this functional definition of the universal nature of language, Cassirer takes us back to the very foundations of his theory: In terms of the theory of language acquisition, children are capable of acquiring word meanings because they have a-priori knowledge of the function of language as a symbolic form. What is this function? What is the task which the different languages accomplish in the life of their speaking communities? Well, it is the task of isolating and foregrounding a certain set of semantic notions as centers of perceptual attention. And if different languages isolate different sets of semantic notions, how is it possible for them to accomplish the same task? How is it possible for the children to zoom in on the set of semantic notions isolated by their specific language? A very reasonable answer would be that some of the major semantic notions involved are universalnotions such as space, time, plurality, the concrete and the abstract -and that these notions function in all languages as the major centers of perceptual attention. Children use their a-priori knowledge of the functional unity of language, and their knowledge of the universals of linguistic meaning just as "the blind man uses his stick." This is how they "come to terms with the objective world." This is a deeply synthetic answer: It refuses to ignore the semantic and structural diversity of languages -different languages may construct different varieties of the universal notions; they may also construct other semantic notions which are unique to them; and they may definitely use different structural means to "accomplish their task" -but it chooses nevertheless to center on the universalistic essence of linguistic knowledge as a functional entity. "The crucial question," Cassirer tells us, always remains whether we seek to understand the function by the structure or the structure by the function, which one we choose to "base" upon the other... For the fundamental principle of critical thinking, the principle of the "primacy" of the function over the object assumes in each special field a new form and demands a new and dependent explanation. Along with the pure function of cognition we must seek to understand the function of linguistic thinking, the function of mythical and religious thinking, and the function of artistic perception, in such a way as to disclose how in all of them there is attained an entirely determinate formation, not exactly of the world, but rather making for the world, for an objective, meaningful context and an objective unity that can be apprehended as such. (Cassirer 1953, 79-80) 
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, let us take a final look at the linguistic examples we have started with. Discussing the behavioral patterns of the sets of English verbs in (l)-(4), we noted that the modern Hebrew equivalents of these verbs have different patterns of behavior. Modern Hebrew verbs seem to be much more constrained in the types and combinations of arguments they can take: Sentences like 'Pat ran herself ragged' and 'Pat ran her shoes to shreds,' for example, are completely ungrammatical. From the autonomously-syntactic perspective, these facts should be captured by lexical stipulations: The lexical entries of the relevant synonymous verbs in English and modern Hebrew should include different sets of syntactic arguments. This, as we have seen, has for a long time been the accepted account within the Structuralist tradition. Needless to say, this account does not serve to explain the facts. A semantic account, of the type suggested by Rappaport-Hovav and Levin (1997) , paves the way towards a real explanation: It highlights the fact that the verbs in both languages have the same syntactic behavior when used with their basic meanings; they differ in their syntactic behavior when used with their extended meanings. Modern Hebrew does not allow the same range of extensions to the basic meanings of the verbs.
More research is needed to find out whether this is a robust phenomenon: Do English and modern Hebrew adopt these respective strategies with respect to their lexicons in their entirety? Do other languages adopt similar strategies with respect to the extensions of lexical meanings they allow? At the moment, however, we may safely make the following statements: (i) English and modern Hebrew share the same semantic structures in the representations of their verbs; (ii) the set of basic event types is a very good candidate for a major universal of lexical semantics; (iii) the two strategies of lexical elasticity, adopted by English and modern Hebrew, are couched within this very same universal framework; they represent two variations made possible by the same lexical apparatus; (iv) the structure of the lexical apparatus rules out other strategies, which may seem to be logically-possible; for example, it seems very unlikely that a natural language will be found which reverses the direction of lexical extension, and allows accomplishments to be used as activities, but not the other way around.
This tentative explanatory framework is characterized by a number of constitutive properties: First, the pattern of grammatical behavior, in each of the languages, is explained as a reflection of a built-in meaning-based schema; notions of meaning constitute the basis for the linguistic explanation. Second, the constitutive notions of meaning -in our case, the set of event types and the notion of verbal elasticity -are not logically necessary. In other words, they are not based exclusively on the way the world is; rather, they constitute in and of themselves centers of semantic attention. Third, the pattern of grammatical variability is explained as a reflection of a parallel variability in the way the different languages treat these semantic notions. Fourth, linguistic variability is explained in universalistic terms, thus allowing for specific patterns of variability within universally-constrained limits. These fundamental components of the framework are synthetic notions. They allow for an explanatory theory which transcends the black-and-white dichotomies of rationalism and empiricism, universalism and relativism. They are, in their very essence, Cassirerian concepts.
